Jameel Jaffer

I'm Jameel Jaffer, and this is "War & Speech," an exploration of the free speech fallout of the war in Israel and Gaza. In this episode, we're coming back to the intersection of free speech and anti-discrimination law, and in particular to the question of what anti-discrimination law requires universities to do and should require universities to do when one student group's call for justice or equality or liberation is heard by another group of students as a call for discrimination or violence. We've touched on this already with multiple guests including Genevieve Laker, Eugene Volokh, Radhika Sainath, and Will Creeley, but it's a thorny essential question, so we're going to tackle it again. To help us do that, we have with us one of the country's most respected constitutional scholars, Michael Dorf, who is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law at Cornell Law School. Mike, thanks so much for agreeing to talk with me.

Michael Dorf

My pleasure.

Jameel Jaffer

So, Mike, as you know, and as you observed in a piece that was published just a few weeks ago on Justia, student protests are nothing new. In the 1980s, there were protests about apartheid in South Africa. More recently, there have been protests about the Iraq War, climate change, and the killing of George Floyd. Those protests have involved demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, walkouts, and even occupations of university buildings. But we haven't since the Vietnam War seen the kind of large-scale deployment of police that we've seen over the past couple of months. Huge numbers of riot gear-clad police have been deployed to respond to student protesters at, for example, Columbia, NYU, Emory, Emerson College, UT, Minnesota, Ohio State, Yale, and UC Irvine. So what explains this? Why are universities responding so differently this time around?

Michael Dorf

I can't speak for the universities themselves; I can only speculate as an observer. I would say that in some respects nothing really justifies what we are seeing. That is to say there has not been a whole lot of violence associated with these protests. There is occupation of physical space. Putting aside the Hamilton Hall incident at Columbia, the encampments that you see throughout the country are undoubtedly in violation of university rules governing the time, place, and manner for protests, but they are not substantially creating a risk of all violence or anything like that. I don't think there's a very substantial risk of property damage. The grass might get damaged a little bit, but probably less than happens during reunion celebrations or graduations.

What I do think makes things different from the perspective of university administrators are two related things. The first is that for virtually every prior protests movement on campus since the 1960s, the protesters were making demands, but the demands were either of the government or of the university. And while they might not have wanted to accede to those demands, there weren't substantial numbers of other students who felt threatened in any way by those demands. That is to say if colleges divested from their holdings of companies doing business in South Africa during the apartheid regime, you could imagine that there were members of university administration who would've been upset about that because the endowment might've been less lucrative. You could even imagine a sprinkling of white South African students attending the university who would've been offended in some way, but virtually no one would've said, "Hey, this is an assault on my identity," in the way that substantial numbers, although hardly all Jewish students at various American colleges and universities have asserted. So that's one piece.

The related piece, of course, is that there is enormous pressure on universities coming from three main sources. One is from Congress. You have the hearings that led to the resignation of two university presidents in December, the one that I think probably precipitated most of the arrests at Columbia. So that's Congress. The second source is the Department of Education, which has anti-Semitism investigations into colleges and universities around the country, and that's a potential threat to funding for the universities. And then from alumni donors who have been unhappy with what they regard as either a double standard or toleration of student protests that they disagree with. And so I think all of those things have combined to lead colleges and universities to take a more aggressive stance, even when they're not calling in the police, but more aggressive in the sense of thinking of these campus protests as something different from anything we've seen in recent years.

Jameel Jaffer

So at the very center of all of this is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Would you mind just reintroducing us to that law, what it is, when it applies, and what requirements it imposes?

Michael Dorf

Title VI is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which of course is landmark legislation enacted by Congress during the height of the civil rights movement. It has various titles. So Title II governs places of public accommodation, Title VII governs workplace discrimination, and Title VI governs recipients of federal funds. And what it takes to be a recipient of federal funds is pretty minimal. So if you have students who are receiving federal grants for their scholarships, that makes you a recipient of federal funds. And as a consequence, virtually every college and university in the United States is governed by Title VI, public as well as private. What it requires is essentially nondiscrimination on grounds of race, color, and national origin. The Department of Education has issued guidance that says that certain expressions of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and other forms of discrimination, which might be thought of as discrimination based on religion rather than race, color, or national origin, count as race discrimination given the not merely religious, but also ethnic identity of people who are Jewish, Muslim, and members of other minority faiths.

And as a consequence, schools are not merely forbidden from engaging in discrimination themselves. So it's not just that they can't discriminate in admissions and other matters, but they are also obligated to take remedial measures and preventative measures when it is credibly alleged that there is student-on-student discrimination going on.

Now, let me say two things about discrimination. So one is just as I'm sure your listeners are probably aware, if you think about last year's Supreme Court decisions barring most forms of affirmative action in higher education, one of those cases involved the University of North Carolina, and that was decided under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The other case involved Harvard, which of course is a private university, but the reason why it was covered is because of Title VI. And so that's the non-discrimination requirement, but it's not just as I said, that you're forbidden from discriminating, you're also forbidden from tolerating it. And discrimination is not simply drawing distinctions in the handing out of various benefits or the imposition of various penalties.

Under long-standing Supreme Court precedent, harassment based on race counts as a form of race discrimination. The leading cases actually involve sex discrimination. So sexual harassment is forbidden in the workplace because Supreme Court case law construes such harassment as a form of workplace discrimination. The key move though is that the obligation is on the university, not merely not to engage in discrimination or harassment, but to take active measures to prevent and then remediate it. And that's how we get into the current situation because it's alleged in various lawsuits that have been filed already against a number of universities that policies of toleration of the pro-Palestinian protestors are tantamount to toleration of anti-Semitic harassment.

Jameel Jaffer

Help me understand how the First Amendment is relevant here. So many of the universities that we have been thinking about in this podcast are private universities. They're not governed by the First Amendment, and yet the question we've been asking is how can Title VI be reconciled with the First Amendment? So why is that the right question or an appropriate question to ask?

Michael Dorf

Yeah, I think it arises in three different ways. First, of course, Title VI also applies to public universities, and Title VI is going to be construed to mean the same thing when it applies to Colombia as it does when it's applied to CUNY. That is to say it's the same statute. And so whatever limits the First Amendment places on Title VI as applied to CUNY and other public universities, will also necessarily carry over in its application to private universities like Colombia or Cornell. And therefore, if we want to know what does Title VI require, well, we know that even as to private universities, it can't require anything that if undertaken by a public university would violate the First Amendment because Title VI is just a statute the first time it is part of the Constitution. So if there's a conflict, the First Amendment is going to prevail. So that's the first reason why the First Amendment is relevant because it tells us the limits of what Title VI requires.

Secondly, even if you set aside public universities, there is some extent to which if the government tells a private actor, you must do something to suppress some third party's speech, that converts the private actor into an arm of the government for purposes of the First Amendment rights of that third party. Now, not every time the government gives private actors instructions is that creates state action in constitutional terms, but that is at least an argument that's available to say that if Title VI is construed too aggressively, then that is a violation of the First Amendment rights of the people who are then going to be the indirect targets of that construction. So that's the second way in which the First Amendment might be relevant.

The third way is essentially through contract. Most American colleges and universities, and certainly all of the great ones, adhere to something like the First Amendment as a matter of internal governance, often incorporated through various binding legal documents such as the conditions of tenure with respect to faculty, and student codes can become part of the contractual arrangement for students who pay their tuition and in return expect that certain rules are going to be followed. And so as a matter of internal governance enforced by contract law, but even if not enforced by contract law, then as just a matter of principle, most American colleges and universities uphold principles of free speech that are if not identical to those that apply to government by the direct force of the First Amendment, are at least broadly similar.

Jameel Jaffer

So one question that turns out to matter a great deal in this context is whose perspective should count in determining whether speech creates a hostile environment under Title IV? Pro-Palestinian protesters, including Jewish protesters say they're protesting the war and the occupation, but other Jewish students hear that speech as a call for discrimination or even violence. How have we adjudicated those kinds of disagreements in other contexts and how do you think we should adjudicate them here?

Michael Dorf

So the short answer is the law is very sparse on this question. You will often see things that say something like an objective, reasonable observer. And of course that just begs the question, well, is that objective reasonable observer participating in the protests or observing them and being offended or feels threatened by them?

The closest thing I can think as an analogy is a line of cases that was distinctive to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the context of the Establishment Clause. So the Establishment Clause forbids government from establishing religion, which is often associated with the principle of separation of church and state. And one of the contexts in which that issue often would arise involve involved religious displays on public property. So a town or village would have a creche displayed around Christmastime, and the question was, was the government, Justice O'Connor's test, endorsing Christianity by doing that? And the way she wanted to ask that question is, how would a reasonable non-believer understand the message? Would they feel that they were being communicated the message that they are an outsider? Her test adopted what we might call a listener perspective rather than a speaker perspective. But it's important to note that number one, that was with respect to the Establishment Clause, and number two, that was only her view, which has since been repudiated by the Supreme Court majority, even in the context of the establishment clause. So that's just one voice saying you should adopt a listener perspective.

In most other contexts, the courts have resisted categorically saying whether you should adopt a listener perspective or a speaker perspective, and there are reasons why you could understand how you should take one or the other. If you're thinking about it in terms of what is best for fostering community and making everybody feel included, well then of course you want to take a listener perspective. And if you think about it in a small community, if somebody says, "I'm offended by your language," and say, "Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't know. I'll use different language in the future even if I'm expressing ideas that you disagree with." You see this actually a little bit in the MIT principles. I've had occasion recently to review the speech policies of a number of universities, and what MIT says is, well, let's not think about this in terms of rights. Let's think about this in terms of interests. And people have an interest in not being offended, even if what you were saying was not from your perspective meant to be offensive. So that's the argument for the listener perspective.

But there's also a tremendous argument for the speaker perspective, which is generally we say that the First Amendment doesn't make anybody into a censor. That if you're not threatening harm, if you're not repeatedly abusing someone, you get to control the way in which you speak your message. So that's the claim of the demonstrators. So you take these various contested slogans. So what does it need to say Palestine will be free? Well, it depends on whose perspective you have. It's possible that someone could mean by that, that Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and stop the war on Gaza. It's also possible to think you'll go back to pre-1948 or something else. Same thing with the word intifada, which has at least potentially a different meaning for speakers and listeners.

I'm here to say that we haven't resolved whether one categorically adopts a speaker perspective or a listener perspective. I think where we ought to be is that as a matter of community building, we ought to take a listener perspective, but as a matter of right, we should probably take a speaker perspective.

Jameel Jaffer

So I guess I wonder whether taking a listener perspective would really lead to the results that the people advocating that course want. I mean, right now the people advocating that course most vocally are people who are sympathetic to the Jewish students. I don't know if it's only Jewish students, but mainly Jewish students who are offended by some of the slogans that pro-Palestinian protesters are using. But you could easily imagine all of this just flipped around, and it's a Palestinian student who says to university administrators that she feels threatened or intimidated by Israeli students who are waving the Israeli flag singing the Israeli national anthem. And the Palestinian students says that to her, the Israeli flag and anthem signified the dispossession and elimination of her people. And the Israeli students meanwhile say that the flag and anthem stand for Jewish self-determination and resilience and dignity, we'd be in the same place. And so I wonder whether the people who are advocating right now that universities should take the listener's perspective have really thought through the implications of that course.

Michael Dorf

No, of course they haven't. And we know that because less than a year ago, many of those same people were complaining about the listener perspective. It is not universally true that the current conflict divides along a left-right perspective. But a lot of the people... I mean, think about Elise Stefanik's hearings. A lot of the people who are most aggressive in challenging the universities for being insufficiently tough on the protesters because those people are taking a listener's perspective, were extremely critical of colleges and universities for coddling so-called snowflakes and having DEI initiatives that aimed to make people feel more comfortable to treat universities as a safe space, all of which is about the listener's perspective.

And so it's certainly not the case that either a speaker's perspective or a listener's perspective systematically favors any one group or ideological perspective in any number of a conflict. I think the only thing that we can say categorically is that the vast majority of people who seem to be voicing opinions about whether one ought to take a listener's perspective or a speaker's perspective are not thinking about this from the hide of veil of ignorance, but rather they want a listener's perspective when they're the listener and they want a speaker's perspective when they're the speaker.

Jameel Jaffer

Dave Pozen, who as you know is a law professor here at Columbia, wrote a really interesting post for Balkinization. And one argument that he made in that post is that the concept of hostile environment is perhaps not well suited to a situation in which "one group's asserted experience of discriminatory harassment corresponds so closely with another group's asserted expression of political protest". And he goes on, he says that the debate here is inextricably bound up with a higher order arguments about who gets to set the terms of acceptable discourse on Israel-Palestine issues. And I'm just wondering whether you have any reaction to those observations.

Michael Dorf

So I think I generally agree with that. I guess I would add another piece, which is that the hostile environment idea is imported largely from the workplace discrimination context where there is much more case law. And part of the genesis of the whole notion of a hostile environment, I mean, it originates in academic work by Catharine MacKinnon, but when the courts adopt it, I think the way in which they are tacitly rationalizing it with principles of free speech is the idea that people are a kind of captive audience at work.

So just to give an example, one of the very common ways in which employers are found to be liable for sexual harassment is when they tolerate employees putting up pornographic pictures in the workplace. And that is said to understandably create a hostile environment for many of the female employees. Now, these are non-obscene pictures. This is material that the people putting it up would have a right to display in their homes or to view outside of the workplace. And so you might ask, well, how can you then the government say, well, you have to take it down at work? And the answer is, well, at work you have to obey certain rules of decorum for the benefit of your fellow employees. I think that rationale might translate to some extent to college and university campuses.

So for example, to take a recent controversy from your campus, when Barnard recently banned all displays on dormitory doors, that was arguably an overreaction to what people were displaying, but it was an overreaction because anything short of that would've been seen as potentially making case-by-case censorship decisions to prevent people from feeling very much uncomfortable in their own homes. So part of a college campus is it's a home for the students, and they're your kind of captive audience. I think that's less true on the campus itself, which is more like the sort of public park where you see something you don't like, you just continue walking even if you have to walk by it every day. So I think right off the bat, there are reasons to be skeptical about the wholesale importation of the hostile environment idea to colleges and universities.

Now, Dave, I think was making a somewhat different point, and he was making the point that's not necessarily limited to universities. It could be for workplaces as well. And that is that there is something very problematic about defining what is really core political speech as creating a hostile environment. We can change the political valence a little bit if we ask, well, what if college said you can't wear a MAGA hat on campus? Now, I find lots of the ideas associated with those hats to be offensive, repugnant, not exactly threatening, but of course in most of these cases, we're not talking about things that are threatening either. That is to say if a bunch of students are chanting pro-Palestinian slogans, if a student thinks, well, that entails the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, yeah, it entails it potentially from a listener perspective, but it doesn't threaten it in any sort of immediate sense.

And so I am sympathetic to the idea that hostile environment doesn't apply very well where you've got a contested political issue. I want to back off that a little bit though, because of course some of the most clear examples of what we might call hate speech are associated with political movements. Nazism, the Klan, these are political ideas. They're not just social movements or something like that. There we might say that there is possibility of saying that that creates a hostile environment. If you had think about the Charlottesville incident, which wasn't technically a matter of what UVA was doing, but it's in a college town.

And what that tells us, I think, is that we don't really have the tools yet for navigating these kinds of conflicts because ordinarily we say, well, if it's political speech, it's untouchable and that you shouldn't be making judgments. That all political speech is equal from the perspective of the First Amendment. But if the idea is Israel-Palestine conflict is complicated, people have different perspectives, that's not something we would say about pro-Klan or pro-Nazi speech. And that's not to say that we can't draw distinctions. I would very much want to draw those distinctions. It is to say that it's kind of impossible to fully step outside of the underlying substance of the disagreement.

Jameel Jaffer

So one distinction that Eugene Volokh has proposed in the Title VII context is the distinction between speech that is directed at a general audience or not directed at anyone in particular, and speech that is targeted at a particular individual. The argument was speech should count as harassing only if it is targeted at a specific individual. And if you, instead of targeting your hostile speech at a particular individual, you put up a poster that makes the same political point but isn't aimed at a specific person, that should not be prescribable under Title VII. And that argument was rejected. You rejected it, and it was rejected by the courts as well in the Title VII context, but at least in theory, we could draw that kind of distinction in the Title VI context.

Michael Dorf

The lower courts have generally rejected this argument. The Supreme Court has never fully addressed it, although I think it has implicitly rejected it in allowing for liability for hostile environments, even without this requirement of things being individually directed. There are other contexts in which I think it's quite sensible. So think about Frisby against Schultz. This is the case involving targeted picketing where the court allows a local ordinance that forbids, in that case, anti-abortion protesters although the ordinance wasn't specific to that, from just sort of gathering nonstop outside the home of a doctor who performed abortions on the theory that he's entitled to some relief. You can have a march, you can have a rally, but you can't just camp out in front of somebody's home.

And I think the idea of distinguishing between targeted messages and those that are just sort of going out to the public generally is connected to this notion of a captive audience. And it is, I think, a sensible place where the line could be drawn. I'm a little hesitant to endorse it fully, however, because I do think that campuses have some of the characteristics of workplaces that make me skeptical of Eugene's proposal with respect to workplaces.

And the other thing I would say is I would like to see a campus culture in which people with very different ideas, even ones that are inimical to one another, can get together and exchange ideas freely. And I don't know whether we get to that place more readily by saying, hey, there's just certain things you can't do because they're going to be perceived by your interlocutors as a form of harassment, or by saying, no, you can say whatever you wanted, you should have a thick skin and anything goes. I take it the sort of free speech libertarian perspective is the latter, and I have some attraction to that, even though I think, again, as a matter of self-regulation and decorum, people ought to try not to say things that are going to offend others if there's another way to make the same substantive point without causing offense and hurt and so forth.

Jameel Jaffer

So it seems to me that there are actually at least two really complicated questions here. The first one is how to determine whether a hostile environment has been created, and we've talked a little bit about whose perspective should count there. But the second question is what a university should do or can be required to do in response. As a general matter, what does a university have to do in order to address a hostile environment?

Michael Dorf

So the leading cases, again, are from the Title VII context. There's a pair of cases called Faragher and Ellerth from the Supreme Court's 1997 terms. I think they're both decided in 1998, and they basically require preventative and remedial measures. Now, preventative measures typically involve educating the relevant community. So anybody who's ever worked for a large organization like a university or any real company actually, will have been through what's sometimes called sensitivity training or harassment training. You learn what you're not supposed to do. And the reason that all of these organizations, employers and so forth have those trainings, it might be because they think it's a good idea in terms of fostering an inclusive and welcoming workplace culture, but it's at least in part because their HR department told them, you need to do this if you want to avoid liability in the event that there is some harassment.

The second thing they have to do is have remediation. And that means establishing procedures and sanctions for individuals who engage in acts that either individually or in combination with the acts of others amount to a hostile environment. And so that's why you see at universities, but also at workplaces, you've got various procedures for punishing, for re-educating and so forth. I don't know how well that tracks with what we've been seeing at campuses around the country. Certainly there's nothing in Title VI that I would read to say, well, you got to call in the cops on the demonstrators. And not even anything that would say you have to suspend students who are engaged in violations of your policies. I think you have to do something that you think is calculated to be effective, but what that is is going to be a kind of case-by-case determination.

Jameel Jaffer

Yeah, there is a kind of really thorny challenge here when it comes to the question of how universities should respond to speech that has created a hostile environment, especially if you take a broad view of what kind of speech can create the hostile environment in the first place. So if you're talking about public core political speech, even if it's extremely controversial and viewed by some as offensive or even intimidating, if you're talking about one of these slogans that we have already referenced, if you accept that the slogans can create a hostile environment, the university is presented with this question of, are we required to suppress that speech? And if we're not required to suppress it, are we required to respond to the speech? And I've heard people suggest that, oh, it's just a response and not the suppression, but as a First Amendment matter, if Title VI is interpreted to require universities to respond to speech, that might be a First Amendment issue too, right?

Michael Dorf

Sure. A one-penny tax that is specific to the press violates the First Amendment. If there is even a small burden that is triggered by one's speech and by the content of the speech, then that is potentially a First Amendment violation.

Jameel Jaffer

Well, I was actually thinking of not the violation with respect to the speakers who are using the slogans, but the violation with respect to the university, to the extent that the university views itself as required by law to respond to this constitutionally protected speech. Isn't that at least a First Amendment question whether Congress can require a university to respond negatively to constitutionally protective speech?

Michael Dorf

I think that is quite similar to the question we see in the internet regulation context where a lot of the internet companies claim that they are both platforms for the purposes of the speech of their users, but that they also have free speech rights of their own. I think universities are situated somewhat similarly with respect to their students, faculty and other constituencies. They are platforms for the speech of those other constituents, but they also have free speech rights of their own. And I think that even applies to a university like the University of Chicago, which under the so-called Calvin principles, has taken the position that they're going to be assiduously neutral and not take stances on public issues. Well, that itself is a stance, and they can say that insofar as we are being obligated to take suppressive measures of our students, that is a free speech position that is inconsistent with our particular position of neutrality or what have you.

Jameel Jaffer

Just thinking through the First Amendment implications of different readings of Title VI. Is it possible to resolve some of the tensions or seeming tensions between Title VI and the First Amendment by understanding Title VI to require universities to respond to hostile environments by means other than the suppression of speech? Could it be limited in that way?

Michael Dorf

I think so, although the question is how effective that would be. If you wanted to ensure that Title VI is not violating the First Amendment, you could narrowly construe Title VI for purposes of constitutional avoidance. The difficulty with doing that is you might then sacrifice more of the egalitarian mission of Title VI, which I think is noble in most respects than you need to, and that therefore you want to. It's also not entirely clear to me what it would mean to respond in ways that don't entrench speech. So the obvious response is counter-speech. This is the Brandeisian idea that the proper response to evil councils is wise ones. So you can certainly have counter-speech, but counter-speech only goes so far, if there really is a credible claim of a hostile environment and so forth.

Jameel Jaffer

So we are at the end of this academic year. Maybe university administrators will have a chance to take a breath, but we'll come back in the fall. And many of the political issues that are with us now will be with us in some form in September as well. And maybe not just in some form, but maybe presented even more acutely. And if you were asked by administrators, I'm sure you have been asked by administrators for advice, what would you tell them about what to do differently in the next academic year?

Michael Dorf

So that is not at all hypothetical. Cornell has created a university-wide committee to review out what was an interim policy on expressive activities. It has, I think, 14 members. I'm one of them. We've been tasked by the president with coming up with suggestions and to listen to various constituencies. It's a committee consisting of faculty from across different units of the university to staff representatives, some students, graduate students, undergraduates. So part of what we are doing, and what I think has been lacking in a lot of the responses is actually consulting broadly with the relevant community. Somebody said that Congress is a they not an it, but the same thing is true of universities. I think that's been lost in a lot of the recent tumult partly because administrators had to make quick decisions. But in many cases, I think they could have listened more to faculty, to students, to staff, and not just made unilateral decisions that I think were probably geared more towards doing what they thought would please donors, Congress, et cetera.

So that's the first piece of advice I'll give, and I think that the creation of the committee on which I serve shows that at least here at Cornell, there's a recognition that the process by which these policies are formulated matters.

The second thing I think I would say as a substantive matter is that one thing we haven't thought through enough is how to deal with speech, part of the point of which is to be transgressive. So we can distinguish between speech that is allowed by the rules and speech that is disallowed by the rules, but I think it makes more sense to divide up into three categories. So there's stuff that's allowed by whatever the campus rules are. You get a permit, you comply with the permit, you have your event. That's at one end. At the other end, you have stuff that's not allowed, and that is really, really a threat. You have a violent demonstration, it destroys property, it's threatening, et cetera. There's a whole range of activities that are in between that violate rules. You didn't get a permit, or the permit you got doesn't cover what you're doing, or you're using sound amplification and times when you shouldn't, but it's not posing a sort of fundamental obstacle to the university's regular functioning.

Part of the point of doing what you're doing is that you are violating the rules in the way that the tradition of civil disobedience says if there's an unjust rule, you violate the rule and you take the consequences. Now, you could say, well, you take the consequences. That's part of the tradition. That's why Emerson meets Thoreau in jail. That's why MLK writes his letter from a Birmingham jail. It's because they are engaged in civil disobedience that they recognize that they have to take the consequences. Yeah, that's from their perspective. From the perspective of the university, I think we need to be much more thoughtful about the consequences that attach to this middle category of deliberately transgressive, but not severely threatening speech.

Jameel Jaffer

Mike, thanks so much for taking the time to talk with me.

Michael Dorf

My pleasure. Thanks for having me.

Jameel Jaffer

Michael Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens professor of law at Cornell Law School. "Views on First" is produced by Ann Marie Awad, with production assistance and fact-checking by Isabel Adler. Research and fact-checking by Hannah Vester. Candace White is our executive producer. The art for our show is designed by Astrid Da Silva. "Views on First" is available on Apple, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts. Please subscribe and leave a review, we'd love to know what you think. To learn more about the Knight Institute, visit our website, knightcolumbia.org, and follow us on social media. I'm Jameel Jaffer, thanks for listening.