Showing 1111–1120 of 2202

• 1/11/1982

  Presidential Authority Over Wilderness Areas Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976

  Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), the President is required to forward to the Congress his recommendations with respect to federal lands studied by the Bureau of Land Management for possible designation as wilderness. He has no authority to refuse to make recommendations for areas he believes unsuitable for wilderness designation, or to return such lands to multiple use management without congressional action upon his recommendation. Under the FLPMA, as under the Wilderness Act of 1964, only Congress has authority to determine whether an area should or should not be designated as wilderness. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22901/download.

  1/11/1982

• 1/4/1982

  Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Native Hawaiians Study Commission

  The Native Hawaiians Study Commission (Commission) was established to advise Congress, not the President or agencies in the Executive Branch, and is thus not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The Commission could become subject to the FACA if it were utilized to advise the President or agencies. The Commission is not subject to the requirement of the Government in the Sunshine Act (GSA), which applies only to "agencies" a majority of whose members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission is not an "agency" as that term is defined for purposes of the GSA, since it was created to undertake studies and not to exercise independent authority. Moreover, none of its members is appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22891/download.

  1/4/1982

• 1/4/1982

  The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States

  The following memorandum describes the development and present scope of the Attorney General's role in representing the United States and its agencies in litigation. It discusses the policy reasons for the centralization of litigation authority in the Department of Justice, and analyzes the Attorney General's relationship with client agencies. It also touches on the Attorney General's authority to settle and compromise cases, and on his authority over litigation in international courts. It concludes that, absent clear legislative directives to the contrary, the Attorney General has plenary authority and responsibility over all litigation to which the United States or one of its agencies is a party, and that his discretion is circumscribed only by the President's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22896/download.

  1/4/1982

• 12/24/1981

  Defending the Revocation of the Tax-Exempt Status of Certain Private Schools in Light of the Ashbrook Amendment

  The Ashbrook amendment's limitation on the expenditure of appropriated funds by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on actions that would cause the revocation of a school's tax-exempt status applies only prospectively, and revocation notices issued prior to its effective date thus remain valid. A bar on the expenditure of appropriations which does not amend underlying substantive law will not lightly be interpreted to prohibit the Executive from appearing in court to defend legally authorized actions previously taken. Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the Ashbrook amendment suggests a congressional intent to bar IRS from defending its valid revocation notices in a court proceeding, though the manner in which IRS defends its revocation notices may be relevant to whether it is complying with the spirit as well as the letter of the Ashbrook amendment. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22866/download.

  12/24/1981

• 12/23/1981

  Executive Power With Regard to the Libyan Situation

  The following memorandum reviews the significant statutory authorities available to the President and other executive officials in dealing with a foreign policy crisis. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22861/download.

  12/23/1981

• 12/23/1981

  Payment of Travel Costs to Witnesses During a Period of Lapsed Appropriations

  Where witnesses have been ordered to appear in court during a lapse in the Department of Justice's appropriation, and lack the financial resources necessary to return home, there exists a sufficient likelihood that the witnesses' safety would be compromised by not providing them the means to return home to warrant a cash disbursement for that purpose under the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(b). Under the interpretation of the Antideficiency Act in the Attorney General's opinion of January 16, 1981, emergency expenditures may be made during a lapse in appropriations if they are necessary to secure the safety of human life or the protection of property. The totality of circumstances must be examined and evaluated in each case to determine whether such emergency expenditures are permitted. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22856/download.

  12/23/1981

• 12/23/1981

  Use of Potatoes to Block the Maine-Canada Border

  A number of federal statutes might justify federal intervention in the event Maine potato farmers seek to block highways at border crossings in northeastern Maine to prevent the importation of potatoes from Canada, or attack federal officers or property at the United States-Canada border. Federal intervention might take the form of direct law enforcement activity by federal executive officials, or a judicial injunction against persons seeking to obstruct the passage of interstate commerce and the mails. In extreme situations, the President may call out the National Guard or the Army to put down rebellions in states that threaten the enforcement of federal law. Federal law enforcement officers have no special authority to make arrests for violations of state law, and they can act in this regard only as private citizens. The Attorney General is the chief civilian officer in charge of coordinating all federal governmental activities relating to civil disturbances. Generally, because the statutory and constitutional scheme of our government leaves the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order largely to state and local governments, the Attorney General has pursued a policy against commitment of federal forces until advised by the appropriate state officials that the situation is beyond their control. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22851/download.

  12/23/1981

• 12/22/1981

  Peyote Exemption for Native American Church

  Regulation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) exempting peyote use in connection with the religious ceremonies of the Native American Church (NAC) from the controls and sanctions of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), accurately reflects Congress' intent to exempt the religious use of peyote by the NAC and other bona fide religions in which the use of peyote is central to established religious beliefs, practices, dogmas, or rituals. An exemption for peyote use by the NAC would not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if the NAC had a constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause to use peyote for religious purposes. The NAC is an established religion, in whose history the sacramental use of peyote is firmly grounded, and in whose doctrine and ritual the use of peyote is central. Nonetheless, it is likely that Congress could, consistently with the Free Exercise Clause, constitutionally restrict or prohibit the continued religious use of peyote if this were the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental purpose. The exemption for the religious use of peyote contained in the CSA does not offend the Establishment Clause even if it is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Under relevant Supreme Court precedent, the government may take actions necessary to avoid substantial interference with religious practices or beliefs, even if such actions are not required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that the actions do not impose hardship on others or amount to government sponsorship or support of religion. A statutory exemption limited to the NAC, to the exclusion of other religions whose use of peyote is central to established religious beliefs or practices, would be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause if it discriminated among otherwise equally situated religions. No different conclusion would be required because the "preferred" religion is composed of American Indians, since the special treatment of Indians under our law is grounded in their unique status as political entities, not in their religion or culture. On the other hand, since no group other than the NAC is likely to be able to establish its entitlement to the exemption, the DEA would be justified in adopting procedures designed to minimize the administrative burdens of extending the exemption to other groups. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22846/download.

  12/22/1981

• 12/21/1981

  Drug Enforcement Obligation of the United States Pursuant to International Obligations

  7/27/2020

• 12/21/1981

  Authority to Pay Witness Fees to Illegal Aliens

  Aliens not legally entitled to be admitted to or reside in the United States who have been paroled for prosecution as defendants, who admit deportability, or who have been adjudged deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), are not entitled to payment for appearing as witnesses in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(e). However, aliens who are currently the subject of deportation proceedings but have not admitted deportability, or who have rendered themselves subject to deportation proceedings and do not admit deportability, are entitled to witness fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821 in the amount of $30 per day. Aliens determined to be excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, whose removal has been stayed by the Attorney General so that they may testify on behalf of the United States or indigent criminal defendants, are entitled to witness fees in the amount of $1 per day. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d); Rule 17(b), Fed. R. Crim. P. Where the language of two or more appropriation accounts makes them equally available to pay certain expenses, and an administrative determination has been made to pay them out of one account rather than any other, Comptroller General rulings require the continued use of the appropriation account that has been selected. Accordingly, witness fees paid to excludable aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d) must in the future be made from the Department of Justice's "Fees and Expenses of Witnesses" (FEW) appropriation, rather than from the Immigration and Naturalization Service appropriation, since such fees have in the past been paid from the FEW appropriation. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/22836/download.

  12/21/1981