Showing 1811–1820 of 2214

• 3/28/1974

  Response to the following motion adopted at the February 1974 meeting of the Interagency Classification Review Committee.

  This memo responded to a motion adopted by the Interagency Classification Review Committee, which sought the OLC’s advice on the delegation of classification authority. The question arose because an assistant to the president asked OMB to prepare an executive order that would confer “secret” classification authority on three executive officials. The OLC concluded that the authority could be conferred by the president in writing by formal presidential under E.O. 111652 § 2(A), and not by executive order under § 2(D) or by the National Security Council under § 2(B)(2). Section 2(A), which permitted authorization of an official, or acting official, by simple presidential designation in writing, applied to the act at issue. Section 2(D) did not apply because the authorization did not concern a department or its head. While designation under § 2(B)(2) might be possible, since the National Security Council had “Top Secret” authority and could confer “Secret” authority on its “subordinates,” it was not clear whether the officials were “subordinates” of the council––and the lack of clarity could present issues of proof in the context of criminal proceedings involving the improper disclosure of classified information.

  4/28/2020

• 3/27/1974

  Use of United States Magistrates -- Policy and Constitutional Questions

  The OLC in this memo considered the constitutional and policy limits on the use of U.S. magistrates, officials appointed by U.S. District Courts to assist judges on a full- or part-time basis. The OLC advised that under Article III of the Constitution, federal judicial power is nondelegable to individuals, like magistrates, who lack good behavior tenure. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had declined to take up the question of whether the use of magistrate judges constituted a delegation of judicial power, the OLC referred back to its own recommendation that judicial decisions on matters of law must be made by judicial officers. It continued to note, however, that nothing in the policy statement indicated opposition to the use of magistrates in the limited capacity they already served in federal criminal cases––conducting trials and imposing sentences for minor offenses, where the defendant had the right to insist upon an Article III judge.

  4/28/2020

• 3/21/1974

  Opinion regarding a matter arising under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945,12 U.S.C. 635 ("the Act").

  In this memo, the OLC resolved a dispute between the comptroller general and the general counsel of the bank regarding the meaning of an exception under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Under that Act, the Export-Import Bank––an agency authorized to do general banking business to aid in financing exports and imports between the U.S. and foreign countries––was required not to guarantee, insure, or extend credit in connection with the purchase of lease of a product from a communist country, except where president determined a transaction would be in the national interest and reported that determination to the Senate and House within 30 days. The OLC, agreeing with the general counsel of the bank, approved the bank following country-by-country (rather than transaction-by-transaction) determinations made by the president and notifying Congress of the determinations and their application to particular transactions. The OLC reached this conclusion because there had been a consistent administrative practice of country-by-country determinations by the president, and the legislation itself was unclear as to what type of determination was required.

  4/28/2020

• 3/19/1974

  Whether Public Law 91-563, Section §4(a) (5 U.S.C. §5751) authorized travel expenses for a United States Government employee summoned to testify before a state agency proceeding, and if so, whether the definition of "agency proceeding" in 28 C.F.R. §21.1(

  The OLC in this memo advised that Public Law 91-563 §4(a) authorized travel expenses for a United States Government employee summoned to testify before a state agency proceeding, and that this authorization was not inconsistent with the definition of “agency proceeding” in 28 C.F.R. § 21.1(b)(3) as referring only to federal agency proceedings. Citing the legislative history of the travel expense provision, the OLC concluded that it was not limited to judicial proceedings but applied to any proceedings, including those before a state agency, where the official would be testifying in their official capacity. It finally noted that Public Law 91-563 §1(a) also authorized court leave for Government employees testifying on behalf of a party other than the U.S., but the authority expressly excluded administrative proceedings.

  4/28/2020

• 3/15/1974

  Title 2, U.S. Code, Section 130(b) [opinion re: jury duty requirements for legislative staff]

  In this memo, the OLC considered two issues: 1) whether the Department of Justice could respond to a formal request from a financial clerk of the Office of the Secretary of the Senate on the jury duty requirements for one of his employees under 2 U.S.C. § 130(b) and 2) whether a member of Congress may refuse to permit their employees to serve as jurors under 2 U.S.C. § 130(b). In response to the first issue, the OLC concluded that it was authorized to give advice only to executive, not legislative, officials per 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-12. As for the second issue, the OLC reasoned that § 130(b) did not provide for an exemption or exception from jury service for any employee of Congress. Additionally, the OLC raised circumstances where a legislative employee could be exempted from jury service––if the person seeking exemption was a “public officer” or someone “directly appointed by a person elected to public office.” Here, the OLC concluded that the position of a financial clerk in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate would likely not fall under this exemption, since the clerk probably would not be a public officer.

  4/28/2020

• 3/12/1974

  Interpretation of the $12,000 salary limitation imposed on special attorneys by 28 U.S.C. § 515(b).

  In this memo, the OLC interpreted the $12,000 salary limitation imposed on special attorneys by 28 U.S.C. §515(b), determining whether the special attorney must be paid at a rate of $12,000 per year, or if the special attorney could be paid at a greater rate so long as the total compensation did not exceed the limitation. Examining the “extremely confusing” legislative history of §515(b) and related acts, the OLC concluded that the salary limitation required an annual rate, with a maximum daily compensation of 1/360th of $12,000. However, subsequent legislative history meant that special assistant salaries varied depending on which statute the Attorney General appointed an assistant under. The OLC recommended that §515(b) be amended to eliminate the precise dollar limitation and conform to the limitations present in other attorney salary statutes.

  4/28/2020

• 3/8/1974

  Further question raised by the Selective Service with respect to the release of Information discussed in Assistant Attorney General Dixon's letter to you of January 31,1974

  In response to a previous OLC memo concluding that the Director of the Selective Service could release information to the Office of Drug Abuse Prevention, the Director of the Selective Service expressed a belief that the Selective Service could not release subject information without approval from the Office of Management Budget (OMB). In this memo, the OLC explained that the director’s position involved a misreading of the Federal Reports Act. Instead, the OLC concluded that the Act mandates agencies to cooperate “to the fullest possible extent” in making their information available to other agencies, and that a provision authorizing the Director of OMB to require such cooperation only provided an additional backstop should an agency fail to comply.

  4/28/2020

• 3/7/1974

  Whether the provisions of section 12(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (45 U.S.C. § 362 (d)), as incorporated by section 10(b)6 of the Railroad Retirement Act (45 U.S.C. § 228j(b)6) into the latter Act, require that the Railroad Retirement Boa

  In this memo, the OLC responded to the Railroad Retirement Board’s inquiry into whether, pursuant to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and the Railroad Retirement Act, the board could maintain the confidentiality of its files in response to requests by the FBI for information on claimants. Examining both the legislative history of the Act and the Act itself, the OLC confirmed that Congress intended for the board to maintain a policy of confidentiality and nondisclosure, with exceptions for the limited instances in which disclosure benefitted the employee claimants or their beneficiaries.

  4/28/2020

• 2/26/1974

  Adequacy of Authority to Investigate Domestic Terrorism

  The document discusses the adequacy of the FBI's legal authority for domestic intelligence activities and the recurring congressional interest in the legal bases for investigatory activity by the Executive branch. The conclusion reached is that there is a push-pull aspect to congressional interest, with Congress sometimes concerned about limiting investigatory authority and at other times concerned about the deficiency of authority and response mechanisms. The questions presented for review include the need for new legislation, if any, and the suggestion for a joint briefing by Kevin Maroney and the FBI on the matter.

  4/28/2020

• 2/26/1974

  Historical Data Involving Subpoenaing of and Testimony by the Presidents.

  In this memo, the OLC presented historical data ranging from 1800 to 1875 to supplement a previous 1973 memo Re: Presidential Amenability to Subpoena. The data illustrates the reticence of courts to compel presidents to make in-person court appearances to respond to subpoenas, especially where the subpoena would require the president to leave his seat of office. Some presidents like Monroe and Grant offered a compromise, responding to summons by agreeing to a deposition from Washington, which allowed courts to avoid the issue whether a president could be compelled to leave their seat to testify.

  4/28/2020