Showing 941–950 of 2202

• 9/24/1985

  Legislation Providing for Court-Ordered Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials to Congressional Committees

  Proposed legislation authorizing personnel of committees of Congress to obtain court-ordered release of matters occurring before a grand jury would violate separation of powers principles by encroaching upon the Executive's control of prosecutorial matters and would entail a major departure from longstanding practices and traditions of grand jury secrecy. Because the Executive alone is entrusted with the power to enforce the laws, the Executive alone should make the day-to-day decisions as to whether the release of law enforcement materials to Congress would interfere with its prosecutorial discretion. Independent access by Congress to grand jury materials without the consent of the Department of Justice would seriously endanger grand jury secrecy and thereby weaken the grand jury as an institution. Access to grand jury materials by other Executive Branch agencies should be limited to cases where access is needed for law enforcement purposes and should require the approval of the Justice Department. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23761/download.

  9/24/1985

• 9/3/1985

  Reimbursement of the Department of Justice for Providing Legal Assistance to the Department of Health and Human Services

  The Department of Justice may be legally reimbursed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for attorney services provided pursuant to the Economy Act, through the employment of additional attorneys in the Office of the United States Attorney, to assist in the defense of HHS against claims filed under the Social Security Act in federal district court. Attorneys employed in that capacity using HHS funds may not "conduct" litigation, but may only "assist" in litigation, because the Justice Department has the exclusive obligation and authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States and HHS has no independent litigation authority. In order to justify the foregoing arrangements under the Economy Act, HHS must demonstrate that it is more economical or efficient to purchase such services from the Department of Justice than to provide the services itself. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23756/download.

  9/3/1985

• 8/23/1985

  Federal Agencies Use of Volunteer Services Provided by Individuals and Organizations Under Proposed Legislation

  Proposed legislation authorizing federal agencies to accept voluntary services from individuals and non-profit organizations would present potential conflicts with statutory requirements that certain activities must be conducted by government employees authorized to act on behalf of the United States. The performance of services for federal agencies by volunteers raises especially significant concerns in terms of federal conflict of interest laws. Although voluntary service legislation may exempt volunteers from the coverage of those laws, the use of volunteers to perform government services could raise the very opportunities for self-dealing and abuse of position that the conflict of interest laws are intended to prevent. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23746/download.

  8/23/1985

• 8/23/1985

  Limitations on Presidential Power to Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign Aid Legislation

  The President lacks constitutional and statutory authority to create a new entity within the Executive Branch to receive and administer funds appropriated under the International Security and Development Act of 1985 (ISDA). The Appointments Clause in the Constitution requires that "offices" of the United States be established "by Law." Any agency created to receive and administer funds appropriated under the ISDA would have to be headed by an officer of the United States, who would occupy an "office" of the United States. Such new offices of the United States must be created or authorized by Congress through enactment of legislation. Presidential creation of the United States Sinai Support Mission under Executive Order No. 11896 does not provide persuasive precedent for Presidential creation of a new agency to administer funds under the ISDA. In that situation, the President was able to rely upon authorization provided by § 631 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which gave the President power to establish "missions" abroad. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23751/download.

  8/23/1985

• 8/2/1985

  State Bar Disciplinary Rules as Applied to Federal Government Attorneys

  The purported imposition of exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction by state courts upon federal lawyers acting in the scope of their federal authority is subject to the overriding requirements of the Supremacy Clause. Rules promulgated by state courts or bar associations that are inconsistent with the requirements or exigencies of federal service may violate the Supremacy Clause. Although Department of Justice authorization statutes have implicitly recognized that federal attorneys may be subject to reasonable conditions of state bar membership and to state ethical rules of general application, the imposition of state rules of conduct which penalize or interfere with the performance of authorized federal responsibilities is not recognized or approved by such statutes. To the extent that a proposed state bar rule asserting "exclusive" disciplinary jurisdiction implies an exclusive right to judge the conduct of federal attorneys by state ethical standards, to impose state sanctions, or to displace any federal forum, it would raise serious issues under the Supremacy Clause. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23741/download.

  8/2/1985

• 6/14/1985

  Operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession

  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides the mechanism for Presidential succession by the Vice President in the event the Office of the President becomes vacant or the President becomes unable to perform the duties of his office. Upon the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President immediately and automatically assumes the Office of President and relinquishes the office of Vice President. The taking of the oath of office is not a necessary precondition to assuming the office of the President under these circumstances, but is an obligation which should be promptly discharged. For purposes of declarations that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office under § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, "the principal officers of the executive departments" are the heads of the departments listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101. The written declarations of Presidential inability triggering succession procedures under § 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment need not necessarily be personally signed by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments. The only requirements are that their assent to the declaration be established in a reliable fashion and that they direct that their names to be added to the document. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23736/download.

  6/14/1985

• 3/22/1985

  Scope of Congressional Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Executive Branch

  Congressional power to conduct inquiries and to exercise oversight respecting the Executive Branch is broad and well-established. This power is not unlimited, however. Its use must be confined to inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws or the determination of whether new or additional laws are needed. Congress may not conduct investigative or oversight inquiries for the purpose of managing Executive Branch agencies or for directing the manner in which the Executive Branch interprets and executes the laws. The Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), establish an area of executive authority in the interpretation and implementation of statutes. Congress may not take action, including action in furtherance of its inquiry and oversight powers, that interferes with that executive authority, except through the enactment of legislation in full compliance with constitutional requirements. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23731/download.

  3/22/1985

• 2/26/1985

  Applicability of Post-Employment Restrictions on Dealing With Government to Former Employees of the Government Printing Office

  The Government Printing Office (GPO) is neither a part of the Executive Branch nor an independent agency of the United States for purposes of restrictions on post-employment activities of certain government officers and employees set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 207. Rather, GPO is a unit of the Legislative Branch. Accordingly, officers and employees of GPO are not subject to the post-employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 207. Special employees of the GPO are also excluded from coverage of the post-employment restrictions, although special employees of the Executive Branch would be covered. Because restrictions of § 207 do not apply to regular officers and employees of the Legislative Branch, it is extremely doubtful that Congress intended them to apply to special employees of that branch. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23726/download.

  2/26/1985

• 2/8/1985

  Inter-Departmental Disclosure of Information Submitted Under the Shipping Act of 1984

  The Federal Maritime Commission is not prohibited by § 6(j) of the Shipping Act of 1984 (Act) from disclosing to other Executive Branch departments or agencies information concerning carriage agreements filed pursuant to the Act, although the Act does prohibit disclosure of such information to the public. Section 6(j) of the Act is patterned after § 7A(h) of the Clayton Act, and the legislative history of the latter provision provides some indication that it might prohibit inter-departmental disclosure of premerger information obtained by the Justice Department under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Nonetheless, in the absence of evidence of legislative intent specifically to prohibit non-public disclosure of Shipping Act information, it should not be inferred that Congress intended to override the general presumption that information obtained by one federal government agency may be freely shared among federal government agencies. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23721/download.

  2/8/1985

• 2/8/1985

  Seventh Amendment Implications of Providing for the Administrative Adjudication of Claims Under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968

  Congress may, consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III of the Constitution, assign adjudication of certain violations of the Fair Housing Act to an administrative agency without a right to a jury trial. Congress may do so even though the statute alternatively permits such claims to be brought in federal court, where the Seventh Amendment would guarantee the right to a jury trial. Such a statutory scheme, under which a defendant's right to a jury trial is in large part contingent on procedural choices of other parties to the proceedings, does not violate the Due Process Clause. The OLC does not provide release dates for its opinions, so the release date listed is the date on which the opinion was authored. The original opinion is available at www.justice.gov/file/23716/download.

  2/8/1985